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It is important to note that the jury in Schiro acquitted on intent to
kill at the guilt phase and then unanimously recommended life at the
penalty phase of the trial. The jury never found intent to kill. At the penal-
ty phase, the jury could have found intent to kill and still recommended
life due to the mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase.
Unfortunately, that part of the record was not discussed by the majority
and furthermore, there is no indication that at the penalty phase any evi-
dence was presented on that issue. Although the issue of insanity was
argued by defense counsel in his plea for clemency, it is unclear from the
opinion whether any evidence as to Schiro's intent to kill was presented
at the penalty phase. It may have only been presented at the guilt phase,
when it was only relevant to the relationship of insanity and intent to kill.
The Court held that the jury could have "grounded its verdict on an issue
other than Schiro's intent to kill." 24 The Court stated that the jury could
have thought that they were only able to return one verdict: "[O]n this
record," noted Justice O'Connor, "it is impossible to tell which of these
statements the jury relied on." The Court mentioned that the judge gave
an instruction which did not differentiate for the jury between the two
types of murder (intentional murder and felony murder). This line of rea-
soning appears to be questionable. Justice O'Connor's argument implies
that the jury may have relied upon statements made by the attorney rather
than on the judge's jury instructions. The law, however, presumes that a
jury will rely solely upon the judge's jury instructions for the law upon
which to base its verdict.2 5 The Court's reasoning suggests that the jury
relied both on the attorney's statements as well as the judge's charge.
Overall, this decision does not have any direct application to
Virginia criminal law and procedure. This is true primarily because
Virginia's aggravating circumstances, unlike Indiana's, do not specifical-
ly duplicate elements of any of the sections of Indiana's capital murder
24 Id. at 791.
25 The only major exception to this presupposition is a very limited
one found in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (ruling that a
jury instruction to consider co-defendant's confession only against him at
jury trial is insufficient).
26 Indiana, unlike Virginia, includes intentionality of the killing
within its aggravating circumstances scheme. See note 2, supra.
27 An example of this point is a defendant charged with two counts
of capital murder, one being in commission of rape, and the other in the
commission of a robbery. If the jury acquits as to the rape count, and con-
victs as to the robbery count, the Commonwealth at the penalty phase is
precluded from any argument or use of the rape evidence.
statute. 26 Schiro suggests, however, that under collateral estoppel, in
those cases where it can be determined that factual issues have necessar-
ily been decided against the Commonwealth at the guilt phase, the
Commonwealth is precluded at the penalty trial from offering evidence
alluding to the matters that have been decided adversely to it.27
After Schiro, certain Double Jeopardy claims which have been pur-
sued in capital cases are proven invalid. In Virginia, the Commonwealth
is required to accept a defendant's plea of guilty at any point at which he
proffers it.28 For example, it has been argued that if a defendant pleads
guilty to first degree murder under Grady v. Corbin,29 the
Commonwealth would be barred from pursuing the capital murder
charge. This is the case, it was argued, because the offense involves con-
duct for which the defendant has been previously found guilty. Grady has
recently been overruled, but even if it had not been, Schiro makes clear
that in a capital case, the guilt phase and sentencing phase is a single pro-
ceeding for constitutional purposes. "The state is entitled to 'one fair
opportunity' to prosecute a defendant, and that opportunity extends not
only to prosecution at the guilt phase, but also to present evidence at an
ensuing sentencing proceeding." 30 Thus, the Court makes clear that there
are some legal issues which may be kept out at a penalty phase; howev-
er, any attempt to plead to a lesser included offense and claim double
jeopardy is now clearly futile.
A less significant but permissible alternative to this discredited
approach is to request a jury instruction that the jury is first to consider
the predicate offense. If they acquit for that offense, then they would not
go on to consider the offense of capital murder.
Summary and analysis by:
Ali Khan Wilson
28 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-283: "No person shall be convicted of
a felony unless by his confession of guilt in court, or by his plea, or by
the verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court, or by judgment
of the court trying the case without a jury according to law."
29 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an
offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been pros-
ecuted), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
30 Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 792.
BURDEN v. ZANT
114 S. Ct. 654 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In March 1982, a Georgia jury convicted Jimmie Burden, Jr. of the
previously unsolved 1974 murders of a woman and her three children. A
complex series of events, including a possible conflict of interest by
defense counsel, led to Burden's conviction, and led also to his ineffec-
tive assistance claim at federal habeas.
The case began in 1981 when Burden was arrested on suspicion of
having burglarized his sister's house. The court appointed Kenneth
Kondritzer, a local public defender, to represent Burden. While awaiting
trial, Burden's nephew, Henry Lee Dixon, accused Burden of having par-
ticipated in the 1974 murders. After warrants were issued for Burden and
Dixon in connection with these murders, Kondritzer began representing
Dixon. Kondritzer represented Dixon in a hearing held in November
1981, where the court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to hold
Dixon for the crimes.
The state indicted Burden for the murders on December 7, 1981.
Kondritzer continued to act as his counsel until he left the office of the
public defender at the end of December 1981 and Kondritzer's partner,
Michael Moses, took over. At trial, the prosecutor's only substantive evi-
dence linking Burden to the murders was Dixon's testimony. Though the
record fails to unequivocally establish that Dixon testified under a grant
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of immunity, there is every indication that he did so. 1 If Burden's asser-
tion is true, then, at some point, while representing both Burden and
Dixon, Kondritzer negotiated an arrangement where Dixon would testify
against Burden in exchange for immunity - a clear conflict of interest.
On federal habeas, Burden claimed that he had not received effec-
tive assistance of counsel because his counsel labored under a conflict of
interest. The district court rejected this claim because while Kondritzer
had a conflict, Burden, according to the court, had not shown that the con-
flict affected the performance of Moses, his trial counsel. 2 The Eleventh
Circuit, finding the record incomplete, remanded the case for an eviden-
tiary hearing on the conflict of interest issue.
3
At the evidentiary hearing Kondritzer testified that he did have an
understanding with the State that Dixon would be immune from prosecu-
tion. The court concluded that there was no conflict of interest however.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that habeas relief was not war-
ranted because Kondritzer's alleged conflict never had an impact on
Burden's representation. 4 More importantly the court held that there was
no factual support for the suggestion that Kondritzer negotiated immuni-
ty for Dixon in exchange for testimony against his client Burden.
5
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's
judgment.6 The Court held that the Eleventh Circuit failed to give proper
weight to the trial court's report that Dixon had testified under a grant of
immunity.7 According to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), determinations of fact by
a state court shall be presumed correct by a reviewing federal habeas
court.
Upon remand the Eleventh Circuit denied relief once again. 8 The
court ruled that the trial court's statements in the post-conviction report
that Dixon testified under immunity were not "factual findings"9 because
the fact that Dixon testified under a grant of immunity was not a fact
"reached after a full and fair evidentiary hearing" 10 and therefore was not
adequately developed according to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(3). 11 Once again
Burden appealed to the United States Supreme Court claiming that the
Eleventh Circuit erred in its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
1 The prosecutor's closing argument, Dixon's testimony on cross-
examination, and the trial court's post-trial report all indicate that Dixon
testified under a grant of immunity.
2 Burden v. Zant, 690 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (M.D. Ga. 1988).
3 Burden v. Zant, 871 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1989).
4 Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352, 1359 (1 1th Cir. 1990). According
to the Eleventh Circuit, nothing in Kondritzer's brief concurrent repre-
sentation of Dixon prejudiced Burden: "the conflict never became actual
in the sense that Kondritzer's representation of Dixon's interests required
him to compromise Burden's interests." Id.
5 Id. at 1359-60.
6 Burden v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 862 (1991).
7 Id. at 864-65.
8 Burden v. Zant, 975 F.2d 771, 775-76 (11th Cir. 1992).
9 Id. at 772 n.l.
10 Id. at 775-76.
11 "In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application
for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a
factual issue ... shall be presumed correct, unless the respondent shall
admit... (3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the
State court hearing... ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(3).
12 Burden v. Zant, 114 S. Ct. 654 (1994).
13 Id.
14 It is true that federal courts have occasionally applied 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 in a manner favorable to defendants. See, e.g., Waters v. Zant, 979
F.2d 1473 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (upholding ineffective assistance of counsel
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case for the second time. 12 The Court
held that "the decision of the Court of Appeals was grounded on manifest
mistake." 13 The Court remanded the case in order to determine whether
there had been an actual conflict of interest based on attorney
Kondritzer's dual representation.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The unceasing determination of the Eleventh Circuit to somehow
disregard the trial court's finding that Dixon had indeed testified under a
grant of immunity is significant for a number of reasons. Most impor-
tantly, it underscores the inconsistency in federal courts' application of
28 U.S.C. § 2254. The federal courts apply this statute strictly in cases
when doing so works to the defendant's detriment, and yet here, in order
to stifle an otherwise valid habeas claim, the federal courts are reluctant
to give the trial court findings their proper presumption.
14
In Burden's case, the record included the post-trial report of the trial
court which stated that Dixon had testified under a grant of immunity.
The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly attempted to narrowly construe what
constitutes a "factual issue" warranting a presumption of correctness
according to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Supreme Court, however, was unwill-
ing to allow the Court of Appeals to deny a fact that was evidently clear
to everyone connected with the trial.
If nothing else, Burden represents a demand by the Supreme Court
that the federal courts apply habeas rules consistently. If federal courts
are going to deny habeas relief by relying on United States Code section
2254's presumption of correctness, they must apply that presumption in
the defendant's favor when appropriate.
To avoid entanglement in the factual presumption controversy alto-
gether (or at least in part), Virginia attorneys should make any objections
based on federal grounds both at the pretrial and trial stages. Once those
claim because state court findings of fact on defense counsel's previous
capital experience were not "fairly supported by the record" under 28
U.S.C. § 2254). Courts will not apply the presumption of correctness in
many ineffective assistance of counsel cases if the ultimate decision
requires a finding of law as well as of fact. See, e.g., Clozza v. Murray,
913 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1990); Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513 (11th
Cir. 1992).
In the vast majority of capital cases, however, federal courts use 28
U.S.C. § 2254 to the defendant's disadvantage. See Adams v. Aiken, 965
F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1992) (ruling that state court findings on competency
entitled to presumption of correctness); Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404
(4th Cir. 1992) (holding that facts relating to interrogation, adverse to the
defendant's position, are presumed to be correct); Washington v. Murray,
952 F.2d 1472 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that state court finding that defen-
dant's confession was voluntary is entitled to presumption of correct-
ness); Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that pre-
vious state court findings relating to defendant's acceptance of a plea
agreement are presumed correct); Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th
Cir. 1991) (holding that state court findings rejecting a Brady claim pre-
sumed correct).
A similar trend is apparent from a survey of Eleventh Circuit capital
cases. See Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384 (1th Cir. 1994) (upholding state
court finding of fact in capital case); White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218
(11 th Cir. 1992) (ruling that state court finding that defense counsel was
not under the influence of drugs or alcohol is entitled to the presumption
of correctness). See also Bush" v. Singletary, 988 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir.
1993); Hance v. Zant, 981 F.2d 1180 (1lth Cir. 1993); Horton v. Zant,
941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991).
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claims are rejected on direct appeal, counsel has exhausted his state reme-
dies, and may proceed directly to federal habeas. 15 Upon federal habeas,
the federal court may make factual findings de novo and is not bound by
previous state court holdings. This strategy strips the state court of anoth-
er opportunity to make adverse factual findings against the defendant, and
defense counsel is urged to employ it. The primary noncapital issue
which Burden brings to light involves the conflict of interest inherent in
the representation of multiple defendants. While defense counsel is not
categorically barred from representing clients with potentially adversari-
al interests, it is strongly discouraged:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised with-
in the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and
free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his per-
sonal interests, [nor] the interests of other clients ... should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
16
15 See Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758, 761 (1993), and case sum-
mary of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. Of course, some
claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel and withholding of
exculpatory evidence, are properly presented for the first time in most
cases at state habeas. State court fact findings on those matters cannot be
avoided.
The Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility specifically warns
lawyers about the pitfalls inherent in the representation of multiple
clients:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment
required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation
of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on
behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises
whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients
who may have differing interests, whether such interests be
conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.
17
When representing capital defendants, attorneys should be cognizant of
the delicacy of the proceedings and should, at all costs, avoid represent-
ing anyone who might compromise the defense of the capital defendant.
Summary and analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
16 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-1 (emphasis
added).
17 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-14 (emphasis
added).
WASHINGTON v. MURRAY
4 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1993)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
A jury convicted Earl Washington, Jr. of the rape and capital murder
of Rebecca Lynn Williams, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
the conviction on direct appeal. 1 Washington, a black man with an I.Q.
of 69,2 had confessed to police.3 Before trial, Washington's counsel
received exculpatory forensic evidence which he did not introduce. The
evidence was in the form of blood type test results from semen stains
found on a blanket on the bed where the attack occurred; the results
excluded Washington as the depositor of the semen.4 Washington raised
the issue of his trial counsel's failure to appreciate the significance of the
forensic evidence as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at federal
habeas. The district court denied his petition without an evidentiary hear-
ing, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded. 5 On remand, the
district court found that Washington had not received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.6 Washington appealed, and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the case a second time.
7
I Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577
(1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985).
2 Washington v. Murray (Washington 1), 952 F.2d 1472, 1475 (4th
Cir. 1991) ("that of a child in the 10.3 year age group").
3 Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 542, 323 S.E.2d at 582.
4 Washington I, 952 F.2d at 1476.
5 Id. at 1475.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that counsel had failed the per-
formance prong of the Strickland v. Washington8 ineffective assistance of
counsel test, but holding that the defendant had failed to show the requi-
site degree of prejudice caused by the failure.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In the landmark Strickland case, the United States Supreme Court
established the standards of review of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. 9 It formulated a two-prong test to assess the performance of the
trial attorney and the prejudice, if any, to the defendant. 10
As to the performance prong of Strickland - which considers
"whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circum-
stances"11 - the district court concluded that counsel had made a "strate-
6 Washington v. Murray (Washington I), 4 F.3d 1285, 1286 (4th
Cir. 1993).
7 Washington II, 4 F.3d at 1286.
8 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9 1d.
10 Id. at 687-696.
11 Id. at 688.
